The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 relies on MD5 for password hashing, which opens up various attack possibilities (including rainbow tables) with low…
The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 stores certain cleartext information in memory, even though memory content may be accessible to an adversary through…
The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 implements authentication through a long-lived credential (e.g., not a token with a short expiration time) that can…
The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 is based on a JSP application in which the heap content is roughly equivalent to a "core dump" in which a password p…
The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 configures Spring Boot Actuator with an exposed heap dump endpoint at a /heapdump URI, as exploited in the wild in M…
The admin panel in the TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 allows attackers to discover usernames, e-mail addresses, passwords, and telephone numbers.
The TeleMessage service through 2025-05-05 relies on the client side (e.g., the TM SGNL app) to do MD5 hashing, and then accepts the hash as the authentication…
The TeleMessage archiving backend through 2025-05-05 accepts API calls (to request an authentication token) from the TM SGNL (aka Archive Signal) app with the…
The TeleMessage archiving backend through 2025-05-05 holds cleartext copies of messages from TM SGNL (aka Archive Signal) app users, which is different functio…