SSRF in Beaugunderson Ip-Address
CVE-2026-69198
ip-address is a library for parsing and manipulating IPv4 and IPv6 addresses in JavaScript. From 10.1.1 until 10.2.2, every special-use classification method is built on isInSubnet, which short-circuits to false whenever the address's own subnet mask is shorter than the reference range's mask. That mask comes verbatim from the CIDR suffix on the parsed input, so appending a suffix such as /0 suppresses classification entirely: isLoopback(), isPrivate(), isLinkLocal(), isCGNAT(), isMulticast(), isUnspecified(), isBroadcast(), isULA(), and getType() all report an internal address as unremarkable, while correctForm() and address still return the real internal target. An application that builds a network trust-boundary decision on these checks, for example a filter intended to block Server-Side Request Forgery, or SSRF, may therefore treat an internal target as external and allow the request. The underlying bit comparison is correct, and mask(n) already returns the first n bits of the full parsed address independently of subnetMask; the defect is solely that the containment guard sits in the classification path. This issue is fixed in version 10.2.2.
Vulnerability class: Drupalgeddon 2 (CVE-2018-7600)
EPSS: 0.004 (35.2th percentile) — read the EPSS interpretation.
Affected products
- Beaugunderson Ip-address — versions >= 10.1.1, < 10.2.2
Weakness classification (CWE)
References
- security-advisories@github.com (x_refsource_MISC)
- security-advisories@github.com (x_refsource_MISC)
- security-advisories@github.com (x_refsource_CONFIRM)