SSRF in Mauriceboe Trek
CVE-2026-54508
TREK is a collaborative travel planner. Prior to 3.1.0, TREK validates only the initial URL before native redirect following in importGoogleList() and importNaverList() in server/src/services/placeService.ts and resolveGoogleMapsUrl() in server/src/services/mapsService.ts. The affected sinks call checkSsrf() from server/src/utils/ssrfGuard.ts and then use fetch() with redirect: 'follow' instead of the DNS-pinned safeFetch() path, so a public attacker-controlled URL can redirect the server to loopback, RFC 1918, or cloud metadata addresses without revalidation. An authenticated trip member can reach the list-import routes, and any authenticated user can reach /api/maps/resolve-url, allowing blind GET requests to internal services without response-body reflection. This issue is fixed in version 3.1.0.
Vulnerability class: SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery)
Affected products
- Mauriceboe Trek — versions < 3.1.0
Weakness classification (CWE)
References
- https://github.com/liketrek/TREK/security/advisories/GHSA-f5vh-p2h5-x735 (x_refsource_CONFIRM)
- https://github.com/liketrek/TREK/pull/1185 (x_refsource_MISC)
- https://github.com/liketrek/TREK/commit/ad893eb1cc75b6d56f402d73a6d41bd48ba7ae11 (x_refsource_MISC)
- https://github.com/liketrek/TREK/releases/tag/v3.1.0 (x_refsource_MISC)