Auth bypass in Crate
CVE-2026-49989
CrateDB is a distributed SQL database. Prior to versions 6.2.8 and 6.3.2, any authenticated user can read or delete any blob whose SHA-1 digest they know, and can plant new blobs unconditionally, in any blob table, regardless of `GRANT`s. CrateDB has two ways to access blob storage: SQL (`SELECT ... FROM blob.<table>` and friends) and the blob HTTP API (`GET|PUT|DELETE /_blobs/{table}/{digest}`). The SQL path goes through `AccessControl`, which is what enforces privilege grants; that's why `SELECT digest FROM blob.secret_blobs` fails for a user who has no grants on the table. The HTTP path authenticates the request but never asks `AccessControl` whether the authenticated user is allowed to touch the table. So a user with no grants gets `MissingPrivilegeException` from SQL and `200 OK` plus the blob bytes from `GET /_blobs/secret_blobs/<digest>`. Deployments that don't use `BLOB TABLE` are unaffected. Authentication itself still works; the bug is strictly that being authenticated as anyone is treated as sufficient for any blob op. Versions 6.2.8 and 6.3.2 fix the issue.
Vulnerability class: Broken Access Control
Published · last modified .
EPSS exploit prediction
EPSS: 0.005 (38.1th percentile), scored .
Very low probability of exploitation in the next 30 days; routine patching cadence is appropriate. 38th percentile — 38.1% of CVEs in the catalogue have a lower EPSS than this one. How to read EPSS.
EPSS over last 30 days · oldest: 0.003 · newest: 0.005 · change: +0.002
Affected products
- Crate — versions < 6.2.8, >= 6.3.0, < 6.3.2