Out-of-bounds Read in Linux

CVE-2026-31614

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

smb: client: fix off-by-8 bounds check in check_wsl_eas()

The bounds check uses (u8 *)ea + nlen + 1 + vlen as the end of the EA
name and value, but ea_data sits at offset sizeof(struct
smb2_file_full_ea_info) = 8 from ea, not at offset 0. The strncmp()
later reads ea->ea_data[0..nlen-1] and the value bytes follow at
ea_data[nlen+1..nlen+vlen], so the actual end is ea->ea_data + nlen + 1
+ vlen. Isn't pointer math fun?

The earlier check (u8 *)ea > end - sizeof(*ea) only guarantees the
8-byte header is in bounds, but since the last EA is placed within 8
bytes of the end of the response, the name and value bytes are read past
the end of iov.

Fix this mess all up by using ea->ea_data as the base for the bounds
check.

An "untrusted" server can use this to leak up to 8 bytes of kernel heap
into the EA name comparison and influence which WSL xattr the data is
interpreted as.

Vulnerability class: Buffer Overflow

Published · last modified .

CVSS v3 metric

CVSS v3 base score 7.1 (High). Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H.

EPSS exploit prediction

EPSS 0.001, 2.3th percentile (scored ); unchanged over 30 days. About EPSS.

Affected products

Weakness classification (CWE)

References