SSRF in Alexbates Tamari
CVE-2026-130161
- CVSS v3
- 5.3 Medium
- Public exploits
- None known
- EPSS
- 0.005 · 41.4th percentile
- Published
- 2026-11-19
What to do
- Fixed in
1.7.2- Affected
- 1 affected product
Tamari is a fully-featured recipe manager web application built using Python and the Flask Framework. Prior to 1.7.2, an authenticated user can bypass the recipe-autofill SSRF check by submitting a hostname under the user's control through the Autofill from URL feature; the hostname can resolve to a public address during validation and a private or internal address during the later connection. In app/myrecipes/routes.py, is_safe_autofill_url validates the first DNS response, but recipe autofill passes the original URL to requests.get, which independently resolves the hostname and can connect to the internal address. The fetched response is parsed into recipe fields, enabling internal-service reconnaissance and potential data exposure; no redirect is required, and disabling redirects does not stop this DNS-rebinding bypass. This issue is fixed in 1.7.2.
Vulnerability class: SSRF (Server-Side Request Forgery)
Published · last modified .
CVSS v3 metric
CVSS v3 base score 5.3 (Medium). Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:N.
- Attack Vector
- Network
AV:N - Attack Complexity
- High
AC:H - Privileges Required
- Low
PR:L - User Interaction
- None
UI:N - Scope
- Unchanged
S:U - Confidentiality
- High
C:H - Integrity
- None
I:N - Availability
- None
A:N
EPSS exploit prediction
EPSS 0.005, 41.4th percentile (last changed ). About EPSS.
Affected products
- Alexbates Tamari — versions < 1.7.2