Improper input validation in Wolfssl
CVE-2023-6937
wolfSSL prior to 5.6.6 did not check that messages in one (D)TLS record do not span key boundaries. As a result, it was possible to combine (D)TLS messages using different keys into one (D)TLS record. The most extreme edge case is that, in (D)TLS 1.3, it was possible that an unencrypted (D)TLS 1.3 record from the server containing first a ServerHello message and then the rest of the first server flight would be accepted by a wolfSSL client. In (D)TLS 1.3 the handshake is encrypted after the ServerHello but a wolfSSL client would accept an unencrypted flight from the server. This does not compromise key negotiation and authentication so it is assigned a low severity rating.
Vulnerability class: Drupalgeddon 2 (CVE-2018-7600)
Published · last modified .
CVSS v3 metric
CVSS v3 base score 5.3 (Medium). Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:L/I:N/A:N.
EPSS exploit prediction
EPSS 0.005, 44.3th percentile (scored ); unchanged over 30 days. About EPSS.
Affected products
- Wolfssl — versions 0
Weakness classification (CWE)
Public exploits and proof-of-concept code
Also mentioned in 2 other repositories (wolfSSL/Arduino-wolfSSL, wolfSSL/wolfssl). These reference the CVE in a list, notes or a scanner and are not exploit code for it.
References
- github.com/wolfSSL/wolfssl/pull/7029 (Patch, patch, Issue Tracking)
- www.wolfssl.com/docs/security-vulnerabilities/ (vendor-advisory, Vendor Advisory)