CSRF in Fastify Oauth2
CVE-2023-31999
All versions of @fastify/oauth2 used a statically generated state parameter at startup time and were used across all requests for all users. The purpose of the Oauth2 state parameter is to prevent Cross-Site-Request-Forgery attacks. As such, it should be unique per user and should be connected to the user's session in some way that will allow the server to validate it.
v7.2.0 changes the default behavior to store the state in a cookie with the http-only and same-site=lax attributes set. The state is now by default generated for every user. Note that this contains a breaking change in the checkStateFunction function, which now accepts the full Request object.
Vulnerability class: CSRF (Cross-Site Request Forgery)
Published · last modified .
CVSS v3 metric
CVSS v3 base score 8.8 (High). Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:R/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H.
EPSS exploit prediction
EPSS 0.007, 53.9th percentile (scored ); unchanged over 30 days. About EPSS.
Affected products
- Fastify Oauth2
- Npm @Fastify/oauth2 — versions v7.2.0
Weakness classification (CWE)
Public exploits and proof-of-concept code
Also mentioned in 1 other repository (leoambrus/artefactswithoutCVEonGitHubAdvisoryDatabase). These reference the CVE in a list, notes or a scanner and are not exploit code for it.
References
- hackerone.com/reports/2020418 (Permissions Required)
- auth0.com/docs/secure/attack-protection/state-parameters (Exploit)
- github.com/fastify/fastify-oauth2/releases/tag/v7.2.0 (Release Notes)