CSRF in Rapid7 Metasploit
CVE-2017-5244
Routes used to stop running Metasploit tasks (either particular ones or all tasks) allowed GET requests. Only POST requests should have been allowed, as the stop/stop_all routes change the state of the service. This could have allowed an attacker to stop currently-running Metasploit tasks by getting an authenticated user to execute JavaScript. As of Metasploit 4.14.0 (Update 2017061301), the routes for stopping tasks only allow POST requests, which validate the presence of a secret token to prevent CSRF attacks.
Vulnerability class: CSRF (Cross-Site Request Forgery)
Published · last modified .
CVSS v3 metric
CVSS v3 base score 3.5 (Low). Vector: CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:L.
EPSS exploit prediction
EPSS 0.007, 54.3th percentile (last changed ); unchanged over 30 days. About EPSS.
Affected products
- Rapid7 Metasploit
- Rapid7 Metasploit (Pro, Express, And Community Editions) — versions < 4.14.0 (Update 2017061301)
Weakness classification (CWE)
Public exploits and proof-of-concept code
Also mentioned in 37 other repositories (0xsaju/Awesome-Bugbounty-Writeups, 302Found1/Awesome-Writeups, abuzafarhaqq/bugBounty, …). These reference the CVE in a list, notes or a scanner and are not exploit code for it.
References
- www.securityfocus.com/bid/99082 (Third Party Advisory, VDB Entry, vdb-entry)
- community.rapid7.com/community/metasploit/blog/2017/06/15/r7-2017-16-cve-2017-5… (Exploit, VDB Entry, Vendor Advisory)
- www.seekurity.com/blog/general/metasploit-web-project-kill-all-running-tasks-cs… (Third Party Advisory)